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Abstract
This Article examines whether the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (”STL’s”) in absentia trial
provisions violate human right norms and, if so, whether the right to tribunal-appointed counsel
or to retrial remedies any such violation. Part I explains the operation of the STL, with particular
attention drawn to the funding difficulties the tribunal faces, and details the STL’s in absentia
trial provisions and subsequent right to counsel and retrial. Part II compares the in absentia trial
provisions of the STL to those of other tribunals to demonstrate that the STL’s in absentia trial
provisions represent a radical departure from prior law. The ramifications of that departure are then
explored in Part III through a discussion of hypothetical challenges of extradition by accused tried
in absentia by STL. Ultimately the Article determines that the STL’s in absentia trial provisions
were in a sense purchased at a price that will be paid by the international community.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 14, 2005, a massive car bomb exploded in
downtown Beirut, killing Rafiq Hariri, the former Prime Minister
of Lebanon.1 Although Hariri resigned as Prime Minister in
2004,2 he remained the "most important figure in Lebanese
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1. See U.N. Fact-Finding Mission in Leb., Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon
Inquiring Into the Causes, Circumstances and Consequences of the Assassination of Former Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri, 1, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/203 (Mar. 24,
2005) (prepared by Peter FitzGerald). The blast killed twenty-one people in addition to
Hariri, wounded 220 more, set dozens of cars on fire, and even knocked down several
buildings. See Joshua Hammer, Getting Away With Murder?, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2008, at 68.
The bomb used is believed to have weighed over two thousand pounds and left a thirty-
foot-wide crater. See id.
2. Hariri served as Prime Minister for Lebanon first from 1992-1998 and then
again from 2000 until his resignation in 2004. See Obituary: Rafik Hariri, BBC NEWS, Feb.
14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4264359.stm. His 2004 resignation
was largely due to a split within the Lebanese government on Syria's involvement in
Lebanon. See NICHOLAS BLANFORD, KILLING MR. LEBANON: THE ASSASSINATION OF
RAFIQ HARiRi AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST 100-15 (2006). The fault lines of the
political divide pitted Hariri, the Prime Minister, on one side and the President and the
Speaker of the Parliament on the other. See id. at 114. Hariri reportedly viewed his
resignation as at most a minor setback and was planning to return to the Lebanese
political stage through parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2005. See id. at 115.
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public life" 3 and was "one of the Middle-East's best known and
most influential politicians." 4 His assassination
had an earthquake-like impact on Lebanon. Shock, disbelief,
and anxiety were the most common reactions among the
people... -shock at the thought that what many
considered to have been practices of the past seemed to be
coming back; disbelief at the murder of a man whom people
regarded as a "larger than life" figure; and anxiety that
Lebanon might be sliding back towards chaos and civil strife
as a result of that "earthquake." These feelings quickly fused
into a strong and unified outcry for "the
truth." ... [U]ncovering the truth about the assassination of
Mr. Hariri [became] their utmost priority and that peace
and tranquility in Lebanon could not be restored without
bringing this crime to an acceptable closure.5
To many, uncovering the truth meant determining whether
Hariri's support for ending Syria's twenty-nine year occupation of
Lebanon led to his death.6 Press reports of the assassination cited
claims from unnamed opposition leaders that some combination
of the Lebanese and Syrian governments was responsible for the
bombing because Hariri supported the withdrawal of Syrian
troops from Lebanon. 7 Lost on no one in the region was that
Hariri's death came less than five months after the United
Nations ("U.N.") Security Council issued a resolution calling on
3. U.N. Fact-Finding Mission in Leb., supra note 1, 16. Hariri was widely credited
with rebuilding Beirut in several senses in the wake of Lebanon's fifteen-year civil war.
See Obituary: Rafik Hariri, supra note 2; see also BLANFORD, supra note 2, at 40-49.
4. Hammer, supra note 1, at 68.
5. U.N. Fact-Finding Mission in Leb., supra note 1, 50.
6. See generally Hammer, supra note 1.
7. See Leena Saida & David Stout, Huge Car Bomb Kills Lebanon's Former Prime
Minister, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at Al. Former Prime Minister Hariri's attitude
towards Syria at the time of his death was quite different than earlier in his political
career. In 1992, when Hariri was first elected Prime Minister of Lebanon, he pursued
accommodation with Syria, which stationed tens of thousands of Syrian troops in
Lebanon. See Hammer, supra note 1, at 71. The occupation purportedly enriched Syrian
generals and enabled Syrian intelligence agents to watch for Sunni extremism thought
to be fomenting in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. See id. at 71-72. This was a
concern to Syria given its border with Lebanon and because the population of Syria is
mostly Sunni Muslim. More significantly, Syria's relationship with Lebanon "allowed
Syria to pursue a proxy war against Israel along Lebanon's southern border through
Hezbollah." Id.
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all "foreign forces" to leave Lebanon-a thinly veiled reference
to Syria. 8
Concerns about both the cause and impact of the
assassination extended well beyond Lebanon or even the Middle
East. The day after the assassination, the President of the Security
Council issued a statement condemning "the terrorist bombing"
and "express[ing] hope that the Lebanese people" would "use
peaceful means in support of their longstanding national
aspiration to full sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity."9 That initial response led to a U.N. fact-finding
inquiry, 10 the report from which blamed both Lebanese security
services and Syrian military intelligence for the overall lack of
security, protection, and law and order in Lebanon.1' Parsing out
the blame, the report faulted Lebanon for a seriously flawed
investigation following the bombing, 12 and Syria "for the political
tension that preceded the assassination."' 3
8. S.C. Res. 1559, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004). The United Nations
("U.N.") Security Council website lists subject headings for the resolutions. See United
Nations Security Council, Resolutions 2004, http://www.un.org/docs/sc/
unscresolutions04.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). The headings tend to reflect the
country or countries with which the resolution deals (for example, Security Council
resolution 1579, "The situation in Liberia" or Security Council resolution 1560, "The
situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia"). Id. Interestingly, the U.N. Security Council
resolutions dealing with Lebanon carry the subject heading of "The situation in the
Middle East," which is either a reference to how interconnected Lebanon is to a variety
of issues in the Middle East or, more likely, a way to reflect that the Lebanese "situation"
involves more than just Lebanon without naming Syria. See id.
9. President of the Security Council, Statement on the Situation in the Middle East, 1,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/4 (Feb. 15, 2005). While the statement does not identify from
whom the Lebanese people were attempting to gain full sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity, the obvious, if unstated, answer was Syria.
10. The U.N. Security Council statement denouncing Hariri's death requested that
the U.N. Secretary-General closely follow "the situation in Lebanon and to report
urgently on the circumstances, causes and consequences" of the bombing. Id.
11. See U.N. Fact-Finding Mission in Leb., supra note 1, 60.
12. See id. 1 62. The report was unable to conclude whether the flawed Lebanese
investigation stemmed from a "lack of capabilities or commitment." Id.
13. Id. 61. According to the U.N.'s fact-finding team:
The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic clearly exerted influence that
went beyond the reasonable exercise of cooperative or neighborly relations. It
interfered with the details of governance in Lebanon in a heavy-handed and
inflexible manner that was the primary reason for the political polarization
that ensued. Without prejudice to the results of the investigation, it is obvious
that this atmosphere provided the backdrop for the assassination of Mr. Hariri.
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Portending that the initial inquiry was but the beginning of
the U.N.'s involvement, the fact-finding team noted that "the
credibility of the Lebanese authorities handling the investigation
has been questioned by a great number of Lebanese, in the
opposition as well as in government. It is therefore the Mission's
view that an international independent investigation would be
necessary to uncover the truth."14  With the Lebanese
government's approval, in April 2005, the Security Council
established a commission to "assist the Lebanese authorities in
their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, including to
help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and
accomplices."' 15 This set in motion a dialogue and subsequent
negotiations between the U.N. and Lebanon that, in May 2007,
over three years after the assassination, resulted in the
establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ("STL") to
"prosecute persons responsible for the attack of 14 February
2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri." 16
The STL was to be a tribunal "of an international character
based on the highest standards of criminal justice." 17 Although
similar in some respects to the U.N. criminal tribunals that
preceded it, the STL is also significantly different.1 8 While the
previous tribunals dealt with a wide range of events over time, the
14. Id. 162.
15. S.C. Res. 1595, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1595 (Apr. 7, 2005). The same Security
Council resolution that spoke in diplomatic terms of assisting the Lebanese authorities
also spoke in blunt terms, describing a "Lebanese investigation process [that] suffers
from serious flaws and has neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach a
satisfactory and credible conclusion." Id. at pmbl. para. 5.
16. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the
Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon art. 1 (1), S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Agreement]. In December 2005, the
Prime Minister of Lebanon requested that the U.N. establish a tribunal to try those
responsible for the bombing. See Letter from Fuad Siniora, Prime Minister of Lebanon,
to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2005/783 (Dec. 13, 2005). The better part
of 2006 was spent in negotiations between Lebanon and the U.N. as to the terms and
conditions of the tribunal. See S.C. Res. 1757, pmbl. para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757
(May 30, 2007).
17. S.C. Res. 1664, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1664 (Mar. 29, 2006).
18. See generally William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a "Tribunal of
an International Character" Equivalent to an "International Criminal Court"?, 21 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 513 (2008) (outlining character and structure of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon ("STL")). In Schabas' view, the STL is international in some respects but not
necessarily an international criminal tribunal. Id.
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STL is focused on one incident, the February 14, 2005
bombing. 9 The mandate of the STL is to prosecute those
responsible for a terror attack with transnational implications if
not origins, but to do so applying Lebanese law. 20 The STL also
reflects a host of procedural differences from its tribunal
predecessors. 2' One stark difference is that the STL provides for
trials to occur in the absence of the accused, or "in absentia." 22
Further broadening the departure from previous tribunals, the
STL allows for in absentia trials where the accused receives notice
of an indictment through publication in the media or by the STL
communicating the indictment to the accused's state of
residence or nationality.23
In absentia trials are controversial and the subject of critical
review by two leading human rights bodies, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee ("HRC") 24 and the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECtHR").25 One criterion by which the HRC and ECtHR
assess the permissibility of such trials is whether an individual
convicted in absentia may obtain a retrial.26 It is unclear whether
19. Though the STL is focused on the one bombing, the agreement between the
U.N. and Lebanon provides for jurisdiction over "other attacks that occurred in
Lebanon" after October 1, 2004, which are "connected in accordance with principles of
criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of February 14,
2005." STL Agreement, supra note 16, art. 1 (1).
20. See generally C~cile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, 5J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 1107 (2007) (discussing the novelty of the STL mandate
to prosecute offenses under the Lebanese penal code).
21. See id. at 1116-22.
22. See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon art. 22, S.C. Res. 1757,
Attachment, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Statute].
23. See id. art. 22(2) (a).
24. Interpreting and applying article 14, paragraph 3(d), of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which provides that everyone charged
with a criminal offense shall have the right to be tried in his or her presence. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPRI.
25. The court interprets and applies the European Convention on Human Rights.
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. The European Convention
on Human Rights ("European Convention") does not state a right to be tried in one's
presence as clearly as the ICCPR. Instead, the right is inferred from article 6 of the
Convention, which addresses the right to a fair trial. Id. art. 6.
26. See Sejdovic v. Italy, App. No. 56581/00, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 44 (2004); see
also U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], Communication No. 699/1996: Views of the Human
Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International
20091
62 FORDHAMIAERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 33:57
the STL's retrial provisions meet that requirement. While the
STL does provide a right of retrial if an accused is convicted in
absentia, 27 the right is to retrial before the STL, a tribunal
scheduled to exist for only three years.2 8 Years often pass before
someone tried and convicted in absentia is apprehended and the
retrial issue arises.29 For the in absentia trial provisions of the STL
to comply with human rights norms, the tribunal would
seemingly need to operate, or have the ability to reconvene, for
as long as someone convicted in absentia has not been retried. 30
Given the financial difficulties in establishing and operating the
STL, the prospects of its long-term operation seem dim. For the
STL to not be in operation, and thus not able to provide a retrial
to those convicted in absentia and later apprehended, would be
inconsistent with the fair trial provisions of both international
and regional human rights agreements.
Whether or not the STL's notice, in absentia trial, and
retrial provisions pass human rights muster is significant in both
the short and long term. In the short term, the tribunal's
legitimacy is in jeopardy. If the provisions violate human rights
norms, states from which extradition of those convicted in
absentia is sought will face an impossible choice: comply with an
extradition request from a U.N. sanctioned tribunal or with the
state's binding human rights obligations. In the long term, the
significance of the STL's potentially flawed in absentia trial
provisions may extend well beyond the tribunal's legacy. There
are broader implications for the credibility of U.N. tribunals,
including whether in absentia trial provisions, or any other aspect
of supposedly settled criminal procedure, are now negotiable.
This Article will examine whether the STL's in absentia trial
provisions violate human right norms and, if so, whether the
Covenant on Civil and Political Protections (Maleki v. Italy), I 7(b), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/66/D/699/1996 (Sept. 13, 1999) [hereinafter Maleki].
27. See STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(3).
28. See STL Agreement, supra note 16, art. 21. Article 21 states that the agreement
between Lebanon and the U.N. to establish the STL "shall remain in force for a period
of three years from the date of the commencement of the functioning of the Special
Tribunal." Id. annex art. 21(1). After the three-year period, the agreement provides for
the possibility of extending the duration "to allow the Tribunal to complete its work." Id.
annex art. 21(2).
29. See Sejdovic, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 11 9-14; Maleki, supra note 26, 11 2.1-2.2.
30. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14(3)(d); European Convention, supra note 25,
art. 6.
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right to tribunal-appointed counsel or to retrial remedies any
such violation. Part I explains the operation of the STL, with
particular attention drawn to the funding difficulties the tribunal
faces, and details the STL's in absentia trial provisions and
subsequent right to counsel and retrial. Part II compares the in
absentia trial provisions of the STL to those of other tribunals to
demonstrate that the STL's in absentia trial provisions represent
a radical departure from prior law, even though there is an
overlooked tolerance for some form of in absentia proceedings
in the other tribunals. The ramifications of that departure are
then explored in Part III through a discussion of hypothetical
challenges of extradition by accused tried in absentia by the STL.
The challenges utilize the most likely venues-the individual
complaint mechanisms afforded by the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") 31 and the European
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("European Convention").32 Part III outlines the
relevant provisions of the ICCPR implicated by in absentia trials,
how the HRC has interpreted the right to be present, and how a
challenge to extradition following an in absentia trial at the STL
might fare under the ICCPR. Part IV conducts a similar inquiry
with respect to the European Convention and relevant case law
from the ECtHR. The final Part discusses the implications if the
STL's in absentia trial provisions are found deficient for the STL,
the U.N., and for subsequent tribunals. The Article concludes
that the STL's in absentia trial notice provisions would violate
human rights norms and that those violations are not likely to be
remedied by a right to retrial before a tribunal of finite duration.
Ultimately the Article determines that the STL's in absentia trial
provisions were in a sense purchased at a price that will be paid
by the international community.
I. STL
Before discussing the human rights implications of the
STL's in absentia trial provisions, some background information
on the tribunal is in order. As will be discussed, of critical
31. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [Hereinafter ICCPR Optional Protocol].
32. European Convention, supra note 25, art. 34.
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importance to the human rights analysis of in absentia trials is
whether a retrial is available. Yet the funding of the STL to date
calls into question whether the tribunal will remain operable and
thus have the physical ability to conduct a retrial. Also, the STL's
in absentia provisions, subsequent right to counsel and retrial
require explanation before being contrasted with international
criminal justice norms to date.
A. General Operation
The STL is located in The Hague, the Netherlands, 33 and
formally began functioning on March 1, 2009. 34 Despite a four-
year investigation leading to its establishment, the STL does not
have any suspects in custody and thus no trials scheduled.3 5
33. See Lebanon: Ban Ki-moon Welcomes Dutch Agreement to Host Hariri Tribunal, U.N.
NEWS CENTRE, Aug. 17, 2007, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=23535.
This decision was made after the U.N. and Lebanon reached an agreement to create the
STL. The STL agreement addresses the issue of location by stating that "[t]he Special
Tribunal shall have its seat outside Lebanon. The location of the seat shall be
determined having due regard to considerations ofjustice and fairness as well as security
and administrative efficiency, including the rights of victims and access to
witnesses ... " STLAgreement, supra note 16, art. 8(1).
34. See Press Release, The Secretary-General, Secretary-General, Announcing Start
of Special Tribunal For Lebanon, Says Its Work Marks Decisive Milestone in Tireless
Efforts by All Lebanese to Uncover Truth, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/12119 (Mar. 2, 2009)
(announcing that the STL "commenced functioning" on March 1, 2009).
35. That there is no one in custody in The Hague is not an indication that the STL
is inactive. In fact, the docket is empty because an STL pre-trial judge ordered the
release of four Lebanese generals from the Beirut prison in which they had been held
for nearly four years. See Four Suspects in Hariri Killing Freed, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2009,
at Al 3. According to prosecutor Daniel A. Bellemare, who did not oppose the release,
I am mindful of the fact that the Hariri case may have seemed only about the
four detained officers in some people's minds and that the case of the four
officers has been portrayed in media reports as such since the investigation
started probably because they have been the most visible individuals in the
investigation.
Press Release, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Prosecutor Informs Pre-Trial Judge He
Does Not Oppose Release of Four Detainees in the Hariri Case (Apr. 29, 2009),
http://www.stl-tsl.org/sid/70. The prosecutor added, however, that "[n] ot only should
people understand that the investigation is bigger than the case of the four officers, they
should also understand that should any of the investigative leads direct us back to them
with sufficient credible evidence I will seek their detention and indictment." Id. Perhaps
illustrating the prosecutor's point, Zuhair Mohamad Said Saddik, a former Syrian
intelligence officer suspected of involvement in the assassination, was arrested in the
United Arab Emirates about a week before the STL ordered the release. See Suspect
Arrested in Hariri Assassination, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 20, 2009, http://www.upi.com/
emerging.threats/2009/04/20/suspect-arrested-in-hariri-assassination/upi-
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The STL is scheduled to operate for three years from the
date of commencement. 36 While there is a mechanism in place to
extend the tribunal,37 funding is likely to constrain any extension
and possibly even the initial three-year term. The STL's funding
is based on a cost sharing arrangement whereby states' voluntary
contributions comprise fifty-one percent of the tribunal's costs
while the Lebanese Government provides the other forty-nine
percent.38 The U.N. Secretary-General's funding goal was, by the
STL's commencement, to have "sufficient contributions in hand
to finance the establishment of the Tribunal and 12 months of its
operations, plus pledges equal to the anticipated expenses of the
following 24 months of the Tribunal's operation."39 That goal
was not met. As of December 2008, funding was sufficient to
commence the STL and sustain operations for twelve months.40
As of February 2009, one month before the STL commenced,
fundraising for the subsequent two years was "ongoing."41
Funding may well dictate the lifespan of the STL,42 which would
impact the viability of retrials for those tried under the STL's in
absentia provisions. 43
96091240244831/. The status of Saddik is unclear. According to the STL, Lebanese
judicial officials submitted Saddik's name to the STL pre-trial judge. See Press Release,
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra. Saddik was not technically relevant to the decision
to release the four generals, as that decision dealt with individuals detained in Lebanon,
and while Lebanese officials had issued an arrest warrant for Saddik, that warrant had
been lifted. See id.
36. See STL Agreement, supra note 16, art. 21.
37. See id.
38. See United Nations, Factsheet: Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/lebanon/tribunal/factsheet.shtml.
39. Id.
40. See The Secretary-General, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General Submitted
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1757 (2007), 2, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2009/106 (Feb. 24, 2009).
41. Id. 21.
42. Interestingly, while the United States is supporting the STL, it is also seeking
diplomatic reengagement with Syria. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Clinton Visits Lebanon as
Key Elections Loom, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2009, at A6 (describing U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton as emphasizing "that the [administration of U.S. President
Barack Obama] would continue to support" the STL); Scott Wilson, Obama Will Restore
US. Ambassador to Syria, WASH. POST, Jun. 24, 2009, at A8 (reporting that the Obama
administration will return a U.S. ambassador to Syria after a four-year hiatus). Doing
both at the same time will be a delicate balancing act.
43. Whether or not retrial before the STL is operating and thus available to those
convicted in absentia but later arrested will be of critical importance to a human rights
body determining whether the proceedings violate fair trial rights. See, e.g., Maleki, supra
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B. In Absentia Provisions
Purportedly at the insistence of the Lebanese delegation
negotiating with the U.N., the STL statute provides for in
absentia trials.44 In general, the STL allows "trials to commence
and to end.., without an accused ever having showed up in
court, and even where they have failed to appoint a defence
lawyer, on the mere condition[]" that the indictment is duly
publicized or communicated to the accused's state of residence
or nationality.45 More specifically, under article 22 ("Trials in
absentia") of the STL statute:
1. The Special Tribunal shall conduct trial proceedings in
the absence of the accused, if he or she:
(a) Has expressly and in writing waived his or her right
to be present;
(b) Has not been handed over to the Tribunal by the
State authorities concerned;
(c) Has absconded or otherwise cannot be found and
all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her
appearance before the Tribunal and to inform him or
her of the charges confirmed by the Pre-TrialJudge.
46
The STL enters a controversial field by authorizing in
absentia trials. Adding to that controversy are the mechanisms by
which the STL will conduct in absentia proceedings, mechanisms
ostensibly included to protect the rights of those tried outside
their presence. Article 22 continues:
2. When hearings are conducted in the absence of the
accused, the Special Tribunal shall ensure that:
note 26; Sejdovic v. Italy, App. No. 56581/00, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17 (2004). For a
discussion of these cases see infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3.
44. See Aptel, supra note 20, at 1121. Lebanese criminal procedure allows in
absentia trials. See id. From the Lebanese perspective, the STL's in absentia provisions
are generous to the accused as, at least at the STL, someone tried in absentia would have
a court-appointed defense counsel, which they would not have under the Lebanese
penal system. See Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Handbook on the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, at 28 (Apr. 10, 2008) available at bttp://www.ictj.org/images/content/9/1/
914.pdf.
45. See Paola Gaeta, To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials In Absentia Before the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 1165, 1168 (2007).
46. STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(1).
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(a) The accused has been notified, or served with the
indictment, or notice has otherwise been given of the
indictment through publication in the media or
communication to the State of residence or nationality;
(b) The accused has designated a defence counsel of
his or her own choosing, to be remunerated either by
the accused or, if the accused is proved to be indigent,
by the Tribunal;
(c) Whenever the accused refuses or fails to appoint a
defence counsel, such counsel has been assigned by the
Defence Office of the Tribunal with a view to ensuring
full representation of the interests and rights of the
accused. 47
Having established that the STL may hold in absentia trials,
upon notice "otherwise given" of the indictment, article 22
concludes with section three, which provides that: "[i] n case of
conviction in absentia, the accused, if he or she had not
designated a defence counsel of his or her choosing, shall have
the right to be retried in his or her presence before the Special
Tribunal, unless he or she accepts the judgement." 48
II. IN ABSENTIA PROCEEDINGS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
To place the uniqueness of the STL's in absentia trial
provisions in context, the following brief review of the evolution
of how modern international criminal tribunals have viewed in
absentia proceedings is helpful. In allowing a complete trial to
occur, without the accused ever appearing or designating
defense counsel, based on notice otherwise given, the STL's in
absentia trial provisions provide for a form of "total in absentia"
trial, a departure from the in absentia trial provisions of other
international tribunals. 49
47. Id. art. 22(2).
48. Id. art. 22(3).
49. The term "international tribunal" is used here to refer to not only tribunals but
also courts and chambers. While there are distinctions between the terms, those
distinctions are not relevant to the STL in absentia discussion.
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In absentia trial provisions are not an unusual feature of war
crimes tribunals. 50 Overlooked by many is the fact that the
International Military Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremburg following
World War II conducted total in absentia trials. 51 But prior to the
STL, no tribunal since the IMT has allowed total in absentia
trials. Instead, modern tribunals, first by practice and later by
rule, generally allow "partial in absentia" proceedings, meaning
that the accused initially appears but is absent at subsequent
proceedings.52
The first of the tribunals after the IMT was the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), established in 1993. 53
The U.N. considered and rejected allowing the ICTY to hold in
absentia trials.54 In so doing, the U.N. Secretary-General
explained:
A trial should not commence until the accused is physically
present before the International Tribunal. There is a
widespread perception that trials in absentia should not be
provided for in the [ICTY] statute as this would not be
consistent with article 14 of the [ICCPR], which provides
50. The concept of in absentia proceedings seems to mean different things to
different people. On its face, the term "in absentia" translates as "in the absence of."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, technically speaking, if the accused
appears for part of the proceedings against him, but not all, those portions conducted
outside his presence are just that, in absentia.
51. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 391 (2d ed. 2008)
(referring to article 12 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal ("IMT"),
which allows for in absentia trials); Louise Arbour, The Prosecution of International Crimes:
Prospects and Pitfalls, I WASH. U.J.L. & POLY 13, 22 (1999). Not only did the IMT hold in
absentia trials, but it allowed a sentence of death as a permissible punishment following
a trial held outside the presence of the accused. Id. Indeed, Martin Bormann, who
served as the Nazi Party secretary, INT'L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER
1945 -1 OCTOBER 1946, at 338 (1947), was tried by the IMT, convicted, and sentenced to
death, all in absentia. 1 id. at 341, 366; see Arbour, supra, at 22 (citing 1 TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG,
14 NOVEMBER 1945- 1 OCTOBER 1946, supra, at 172). The death sentence was not carried
out as the allies could not locate Bormann. See Darius Sanai, The Sins of My Father,
INDEP. (London), Feb. 1, 1999, at 8. Bormann's remains were eventually found and
identified; he is believed to have died near Hitler's bunker in the waning days of the war.
Id.
52. See Herman Schwartz, Trials in Absentia, 4 HUM. RTS. BR. 1, 12 (1996).
53. SeeS.C. Res. 827, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
54. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 101, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
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that the accused shall be entitled to be tried in his
presence. 55
As a result, the ICTY statute provides that the accused has
the right "to be tried in his presence." 56 The ICTY statute even
qualifies the right to be present as one of several "minimum
guarantees." 57 Yet despite that guarantee, the ICTY conducted
portions of Slobodan MilogeviC's trial outside his presence when
the former president of Yugoslavia was unable to attend for long
periods of time due to illness.58 As Milogevi6 attended the start of
his trial, the ICTY did not contradict the Secretary-General by
subsequently holding proceedings outside his presence. But such
proceedings were still in absentia, albeit of the partial variant, the
authority for which is not clear under the ICTY statute.59
The 1994 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR") statute mirrors that of the ICTY.60 While the ICTY
proceeded with a trial when the accused was unable to attend,
the ICTR completed a trial without the accused, when, having
previously attended, he refused to appear in court.61 Thus both
tribunals allowed, at least through practice, partial in absentia
trials when the accused was unable or unwilling to continue to
attend proceedings.
By 2000 the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor
("UNTAET") codified the ICTY and ICTR partial in absentia
55. Id. (endnote omitted).
56. Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo., Updated Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 21(4) (d) (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/legal%201ibrary/statute-septO9-en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY
Statute].
57. Id., art. 21(4).
58. See Marlise Simons, Citing New Medical Report, Milosevic's Lawyers Urge
Postponement in War Crimes Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, at A22.
59. See ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 21 (4) (d).
60. Compare Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 20(4)(d) (2007), available at http://www.ictr.orgenglish/
basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf [hereinafter ICTR Statute], with ICTY Statute, supra note 56,
art. 21 (4) (d).
61. See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment, 7 (Dec. 3,
2003); see also Press Release, ICTR, Three Media Leaders Convicted for Genocide,
ICTR/INFO-9-2-372.EN (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/
PRESSREL/2003/372.htm (explaining that Barayagwiza was tried in absentia after he
refused to attend his trial after the appeals chamber reversed a decision that was
favorable to him).
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practice. 62 The UNTAET transitional rules of procedure allowed
in absentia proceedings if the accused is initially present and
then flees, refuses to attend, or disrupts the proceedings.63 The
Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"), a mixed national-
international tribunal established in 2002,64 utilized similar
language, incorporating the ICTY and ICTR right to be present,65
but qualified that right in situations in which the accused flees or
refuses to attend.66 However, between the UNTAET and the
SCSL was the U.N. Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK"), which, in
2001, issued a regulation prohibiting in absentia trials without
qualification. 67 Finally, there is the Extraordinary Chambers of
the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC"), a mixed national-
international tribunal,68 which promulgated its internal rules of
procedure in 2007,69 less than two weeks after the U.N. Security
Council announced the STL statute.70 The ECCC's procedure
allows for in absentia proceedings if the accused is initially
present and then flees, refuses to attend, or disrupts the
proceedings. 71
62. Compare U.N. Transitional Admin. in E. Timor, Regulation No. 2000/30 on
Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 5.1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/30 (Sept.
25, 2000) [hereinafter UNTAET Rules], with ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 21(4) (d),
and ICTR Statute, supra note 60, art. 20(4) (d).
63. See UNTAET Rules, supra note 62 §§ 5.2-.3, 48.2.
64. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
138; see The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 9, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915
(Oct. 4, 2000).
65. Compare Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17(4) (d), Jan. 16,
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145, with ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 21(4) (d), and ICTR
Statute, supra note 60, art. 20(4)(d).
66. See Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 60(A)
(May 27, 2008), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
zXPrwoukovM%3d&tabid=1 76 [hereinafter SCSL Rules].
67. See U.N. Interim Admin. Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No. 2001/1 on the
Prohibition of Trials In Absentia for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/1 (Jan. 12, 2001) [hereinafter UNMIK Rules].
68. See G.A. Res. 57/228, 2, 4(a), U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/228 (May 22, 2003)
(concerning the prosecution under Cambodian law of crimes committed during the
period of the Khmer Rouge).
69. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev.4)
(Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileupload/121/
irv4-en.pdf [hereinafter ECCC Rules].
70. See S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 16.
71. See ECCC Rules, supra note 69, Rule 81(4) (Sept. 11, 2009). Given how close in
time the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC") and STL in
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Thus, with the exception of UNMIK, tribunal approaches
towards partial in absentia proceedings evolved from being
implicitly permissible in the ICTY and the ICTR to being
expressly so in the UNTAET, SCSL, and ECCC. 72 One possible
reason for the shift is that the international community wanted
clearly stated authority to proceed if an accused initially appears
before the court but later disrupts the proceedings or refuses to
attend, as Slobodan Milogevie did at the ICTY.73 Additionally, or
perhaps alternatively, the UNTAET, the SCSL, and the ECCC in
absentia provisions are similar to those of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC"). The Rome Statute established the ICC
in 199874 and, under article 63, provided that "[t]he accused
shall be present during the trial." 75 However, the Rome Statute
allows for trials outside the presence of the accused if the accused
is disruptive.76 While the trial may continue, the statute requires
that the trial chamber make provisions for the accused to observe
the proceedings. 77
absentia provisions were developed it is interesting that nongovernmental organizations
("NGO") raised concerns about the ECCC's in absentia provisions which do not seem to
have been raised during the drafting of the STL statute. See Int'l Ctr. for Transitional
Justice, Comments on Draft Internal Rules for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of
Cambodia (Nov. 17, 2006) available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/6/O/6O1.pdf;
Letter from Human Rights Watch to the Secretariat of the Rules and Procedure
Committee for the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (Nov. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/11 / 17/extraordinary-chambers-courts-
cambodia. The contrast between the NGO response to the ECCC and STL is all the
more striking given that the ECCC's provisions are in line with the UNATET and the
SCSL statutes, and the policy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY'), while the STL's provisions represent a more radical departure.
72. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 21(4) (d), and ICTR Statute, supra
note 60, art. 20(4) (d), with UNMIK Rules, supra note 67, and UNTAET Rules, supra note
62, and ECCC Rules, supra note 69, and SCSL Rules, supra note 66, R. 60(A).
73. See Roger Cohen & Marlise Simons, At Arraignment, Milosevic Mocks His U.N.
Accusers, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at Al1.
74. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
75. Id. art. 63 (1).
76. Id. art. 63(2).
77. Id. Specifically, the Rome Statute provides that:
If the accused, being present before the Court, continues to disrupt the trial,
the Trial Chamber may remove the accused and shall make provision for him
or her to observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside the courtroom,
through the use of communications technology, if required. Such measures
shall be taken only in exceptional circumstances after other reasonable
alternatives have proved inadequate, and only for such duration as is strictly
required.
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Thus, while the idea that an accused's right to be present
throughout criminal proceedings is neither absolute nor
longstanding under international law, the STL's total in absentia
trial provisions still mark a departure from other modern
international tribunals. Over the next three years, the STL may
try and convict individuals in absentia, in accordance with its
statute, and perhaps with little fanfare. That should not suggest
that in absentia trials by the STL are uncontroversial, but a viable
challenge to such trials may lie dormant while those convicted in
absentia remain at large. 78 A host of issues, and likely post hoc
criticism of the STL's in absentia provisions, will arise when
someone convicted in absentia is subsequently located. 79 There is
no way of knowing when, or technically even if, this will occur. As
noted by the U.N., "[s]uspects whom the international criminal
courts deal with are people who can easily abscond for long
periods, thanks to power, money, help from large and organized
groups, and possibly even from States."80
Id.
78. See, e.g, ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2(3); European Convention, supra note 25,
art. 13.
79. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE-ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 260 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (identifying
"outstanding questions concern[ing] the rights of the accused when ... tried in
absentia."). Presumably, the STL would submit the names of those convicted in absentia
to the International Criminal Police Organization ("INTERPOL"). In turn, INTERPOL
would use its system of international notices to share that information among its 188
member countries. See International Criminal Police Organization [INTERPOL],
INTERPOL: An Overview, Doc. COM/FS/2009-10/GI-01 (2009), available at
http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/factsheets/giOl .pdf; INTERPOL, INTERPOL
Member Countries (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/members/.
Specifically, INTERPOL would use a "Red Notice" to "seek the arrest of a wanted person
with a view to extradition based on an arrest warrant or court decision." INTERPOL,
INTERPOL Notices, Doc. COM/FS/2009-02/GI-02 (2009), available at
http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/factsheets/gi02.pdf. Both the ICTY and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") utilized INTERPOL in seeking to
locate persons suspected of violating international human rights law. Id. This
presumption would seem to be reinforced by the fact that, in 2009, the STL and
INTERPOL concluded an interim agreement regarding the STL's investigations and
other proceedings that pertain to the crimes that fall under its jurisdiction. See Interim
Agreement Between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the International Criminal
Police Organization-INTERPOL, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/x/
file/theregistry/library/cooperation/interpol-agreement.pdf.
80. Conference on International Criminal Justice, May 14-18, 2007, Report of the
Conference on International Criminal Justice, at 54, 6, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/6/INF.2 (Aug.
21, 2007). The conference report noted that Mafia fugitives absconded "for long periods
of time." Id. Contrary to the perception that a fugitive would flee great distances, the
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But when a person convicted in absentia is eventually found
and the STL seeks his extradition, challenges to the tribunal's in
absentia trial provisions may quickly follow. 81 For example, a
fugitive may challenge his extradition through a communication
to a human rights body. The communication would argue that
because the STL's in absentia trial provisions violate human
rights norms, the state from which the fugitive's surrender is
sought would violate its own human rights obligations by
complying with the extradition request.82 The most likely avenues
to challenge extradition and to claim fair trial violations are the
individual complaint mechanisms afforded by the ICCPR and the
European Convention. 83
report also noted that fugitives often do not even leave the country in which law
enforcement are looking for them. Id. The reported cited one instance where a Mafia
boss remained in Italy while a fugitive from Italian authorities for over 40 years. Id
81. See, e.g., Maleki, supra note 26.
82. See, e.g, HRC, Communication No. 470/1991: Views of the Human Rights Committee
Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Protections (Kindler v. Canada), 13.2(b), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (Nov. 11, 1993) [hereinafter Kindler].
83. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2(3); European Convention, supra note 25, art
13. The individual complaint mechanisms of the ICCPR and European Convention
appear to be more viable options for a fugitive challenging an in absentia conviction at
the STL than other regional human rights bodies. Admittedly, the Inter-American
system recognizes a right to be present at trial. See American Convention on Human
Rights art. 8, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (providing a right to a hearing,
notification of charges, and to defend one's self personally or with defense counsel of
one's choosing). But there is little case law from the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights on in absentia trials. The focus of court's jurisprudence has been on forced
disappearances and torture by the state. See Santiago Canton, The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights: 50 Years of Advances and the New Challenges, AM. Q., Summer
2009, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Inter-American-Commission-Human-Rights.
Similarly, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights recognizes rights which,
similar to the European Convention, while not expressly stating a right to be present at
trial could not exist without the accused being present or at least on notice of the
proceedings. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981,
1520 U.N.T.S. 245 (providing a right to have one's case heard and the right to defense
counsel of one's choice). However, the enforcement mechanism for those rights is
uncertain. The African Court of Human and People's Rights never heard a case and is
in the process of being merged with the African Court of Justice, becoming the African
Court ofJustice and Human Rights. See African International Courts and Tribunals, The
African Court on Human and People's Rights, http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts-conti/
achpr/achpr home.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009); see also Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and People's Rights, July 9, 1998, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III).
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III. AVENUES OF RELIEF
Each of the human rights bodies contains fair trial provisions
which in the ICCPR explicitly and in the European Convention
implicitly address the accused's right to be present at trial. While
the right is similar, the two bodies vary on the extraterritorial
application and enforcement of their respective human rights
instruments. Analysis of an in absentia case demonstrates how
each body interprets the accused's right to be present and how in
absentia trials may permissibly be held. All of which leads to
addressing the question this Article posits-whether extradition
of someone convicted in absentia by the STL violates human
rights obligations under either the ICCPR or the European
Convention.
A. ICCPR
1. Fair Trial Provisions
The ICCPR is a U.N. treaty that arose from the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 84 The ICCPR reflects
basic civil and political rights and has been ratified by 165 states,
including Lebanon and Syria.85 Article 14 of the ICCPR provides
for a variety of trial-related rights, including that "everyone shall
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent, and impartial tribunal established by law." 86 More
specifically, "[in the determination of any criminal charge
against him, everyone shall be entitled ... [t]o be tried in his
presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his choosing; [and] to be informed, if he does not
have legal assistance, of this right. '87
84. See ICCPR, supra note 24, pmbl. ("Recognizing that, in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil
and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well
as his economic, social and cultural rights .... ").
85. See Treaty Section, Secretariat, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg.no=iv-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
86. Id. art. 14(1).
87. Id. art. 14(3).
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2. Enforcement and Extraterritorial Application
The ICCPR is enforced through the HRC, which is a "body
of independent experts that monitors implementation of the
[ICCPR] by its State parties."88 Under article 41 of the ICCPR,
the HRC may consider interstate complaints. 89 More relevant to
potential issues arising from the STL's in absentia provisions, the
first Optional Protocol ("OPI") to the ICCPR allows the HRC to
examine individual complaints of alleged violations of the ICCPR
by states parties to the protocol. 90 The HRC has reaffirmed the
OPI limitation that it "may only receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to the jurisdiction of a
State party to the Covenant and Optional Protocol 'who claim to
be victims of a violation by that State party of any of their rights
set forth in the Covenant."' 91
States parties to the ICCPR "undertake[] to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized" by the covenant.92 Thus, a
state's obligations are "clearly grounded in measures it has taken
within its own territory."93 But when a state takes action within its
territory, such as extraditing someone, the state cannot ignore
what later happens to that person simply because the effects
occurred outside the extraditing state's territory and at the hands
of a different state. 94 According to the HRC, "[i]f a State party
extradites a person within its jurisdiction in circumstances such
88. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights Committee,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
89. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 41 (1).
90. See ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 31, art. 1. While neither Lebanon nor
Syria is a party to the optional protocol, 113 countries are. See Treaty Section,
Secretariat, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General-Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg.no=iv-5&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
91. HRC, Communication No. 409/1990: Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Protections (EHEH v. Italy), 1 3.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/40/D/409/1990 (Nov. 5,
1990) [hereinafter EHEH] (emphasis omitted).
92. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2(1).
93. Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
41, 52 (Fons Coomans & Meeno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
94. See Kindler, supra note 82, 13.2.
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that as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights under the
Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party
itself may be in violation of the Covenant."95
3. HRC Interpretation of In Absentia Proceedings Balanced
Against ICCPR Fair Trial Rights
The HRC's 1997 Maleki decision explains the circumstances
under which in absentia trials may permissibly occur and the role
of retrials.96 Maleki stemmed from the complaint of Ali Maleki, an
Iranian citizen tried and convicted in absentia in Italy for drug
trafficking. 97 In 1988, an Italian court sentenced Maleki to ten
years imprisonment.98 Although Maleki was not present at his
trial, he was represented by court-appointed counsel.99 Following
Maleki's in absentia trial and conviction, the court of appeal
confirmed the sentence in 1989.100 Five years later, Italian
authorities apprehended Maleki at the Rome airport as he
attempted to return to Iran.101
The Italian authorities imprisoned Maleki to serve his ten-
year sentence.102 Maleki's son, Kambiz Maleki, then submitted a
communication to the HRC arguing that Italy violated the ICCPR
by trying his father in absentia. 103 Italy in turn argued that its in
absentia trial provisions did not violate the ICCPR, and that
Maleki, while indeed absent from his trial, was represented by
court-appointed counsel and "that therefore he had a fair
trial."' 0 4 Italy also argued that, even if the trial did not meet
95. Id.
96. See Maleki, supra note 26, 9 9.2-.3, .5.
97. See id. 1, 2.1.
98. See id. 2.1.
99. See id. 6.4.
100. See id. 9 2.1.
101. See id. 9 2.2. In 1991, Maleki was arrested in the United States while visiting
family. Id. The Italian government requested that the United States extradite Maleki,
which the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied in 1992. Id. It
is not clear whether Maleki remained in the United States following the denial of Italy's
extradition request, so the point of origin for his 1995 attempt to return to Iran is also
unclear. That Maleki's return trip to Iran routed him though Italy, a country in which he
had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in absentia, id., seems an ill-advised
travel route.
102. See id. 99 1, 2.2.
103. See id. 9 1, 5. Kambiz Maleki did not identify which specific provisions of the
ICCPR were allegedly violated by Italy. Id. 91 1.
104. Id. 91 6.4.
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ICCPR requirements, any violation was cured by Maleki's ability
under Italian law to apply for a retrial. 10 5 The HRC did not find
either Italian argument persuasive.1°6
On the issue of whether Italy's in absentia trial provisions
were a per se violation of the ICCPR, the HRC noted that such a
trial is compatible with the ICCPR "only when the accused was
summoned in a timely manner and informed of the proceedings
against him."10 7 The HRC added that, in order for Italy to comply
with the ICCPR's fair trial provisions, Italy must show how the
notice requirements were met in Maleki's case. 108 This, Italy was
unable to do. Italy stated that it "assumed" that Maleki was
informed by his court-appointed attorney of the proceedings
against him in Italy. 10 9 The HRC described Italy's position as
clearly insufficient to lift the burden placed on the State
party if it is to justify trying an accused in absentia. It was
incumbent on the court that tried the case to verify that
[Maleki] had been informed of the pending case before
proceeding to hold the trial in absentia. Failing evidence that
the court did so, the [HRC] is of the opinion that [Maleki's]
right to be tried in his presence was violated. 10
Italy's argument that any deficiency in its in absentia trial
provisions was cured by the ability of someone so convicted to
apply for retrial"' fared no better. The HRC acknowledged that
the violations of Maleki's right to be tried in his presence "could
have been remedied if he had been entitled to a retrial in his
presence when he was apprehended in Italy." ' 12 On its face, there
did not seem to be an issue-the HRC said Italy must provide a
retrial, a right to which is provided for under Italian law.113
However, providing for the possibility of retrial did not equate to
the absolute right of retrial envisioned by the HRC. Italy's
105. See id. 7(b).
106. See id. 9.4.
107. Id. 9.3. Moreover, the burden is not on Maleki to establish that he was not
summoned in a timely manner and informed of the proceedings against him. Rather,
the burden is on the state party, which, in order to show compliance with the fair trial
requirements, "must show that these principles were respected." Id.
108. See id.
109. See id. 9.4.
110. Id.
111. See id. 7(b).
112. Id. 9.5.
113. See id. 7(b).
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representations on the right to retrial under Italian law were
both generalized and qualified, neither of which aided its
arguments. Italy "described its law regarding the right of an
accused who has been tried in absentia to apply for a retrial" 4
and that retrials were possible "in certain circumstances.",15
Never did Italy represent that Maleki was entitled to such a
retrial.116 Distinguishing the possibility of retrial from an absolute
right, the HRC stated that "[t]he existence, in principle, of
provisions regarding the right to a retrial, cannot be considered
to have provided [Maleki] with a potential remedy in the face of
unrefuted evidence that these provisions do not apply to
[Maleki's] case." 17
4. Would Extradition of Someone Convicted In Absentia by the
STL Violate Obligations Under the ICCPR?
The Maleki decision is instructive on the application of the
ICCPR's fair trial rights to the STL's in absentia trial provisions.
While the HRC interpretation of the ICCPR is that in absentia
trials are not per se impermissible, a state that holds such
proceedings assumes a heavy burden to justify the trials."l 8 In
several areas, including notice of proceedings, 119 appointment of
defense counsel, 120 and right of retrial,' 2' the STL's in absentia
trial provisions appear to violate the ICCPR's fair trial rights.
Before reviewing how those areas would likely fare if held up to
HRC scrutiny, how, and in some cases if, the HRC may consider
an extradition challenge and the extraterritorial application of
the ICCPR merits brief discussion.
114. Id. at 1 9.4.
115. Id. 1 7(b).
116. See id. 1 3.2. More problematic for Italy, Kambiz Maleki claimed that a retrial
was not available under Italian law as the Italian prosecutor had appealed Maleki's
sentence twice and that, as a result, Maleki was barred from further appealing, even to
request retrial. Italy did not address Kambiz Maleki's claim, which he supported with a
letter from an Italian lawyer who cited specific provisions of the Italian Criminal Code of
Procedure in support of the argument that Maleki's case could not be reopened. See id.
9.5.
117. Id. 9.5.
118. See id. at 9.3.
119. STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(2) (a).
120. Id. art. 22(2)(b)
121. Id. art. 22(3)
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a. Mechanics of an Extradition Challenge
As previously discussed, the HRC may only consider
communications from (1) individuals subject to the jurisdiction
of a state party to the ICCPR and OPI who (2) claim to be victims
of a violation by that state party of any of their rights set forth in
the ICCPR.12 2 The HRC was able to consider the communication
in Maleki because it was submitted on behalf of Maleki, who was
subject to Italian jurisdiction. 123 Maleki claimed that Italy violated
his rights under the ICCPR 124 because Italy is a state party both to
the ICCPR and the OPI individual complaint mechanism. 125
Given those limitations, is a scenario in which the HRC
considers the STL's in absentia trial provisions even possible?
The answer is a qualified yes. Assume an individual tried,
convicted, and sentenced to a prison sentence by the STL, all in
absentia, is located years later,126 and the STL seeks to assert
control of the individual and transfer him to a jail to begin to
serve his sentence.127 The analysis of a communication to the
HRC challenging extradition following an in absentia trial at the
STL turns initially on where the communication's author is
located and the state against which the complaint is lodged.1 28
Underscoring the inquiry are the ICCPR's extraterritorial
dimensions.
Lebanon is a state party to the ICCPR but not OPI, and the
STL is not a state, let alone a state party to the covenant or OPI,
122. See EHEH, supra note 91, 3.2.77.
123. See Maleki, supra note 26, 1 12.
124. See Maleki, supra note 26, 11.
125. See Treaty Section, supra note 85; Treaty Section, supra note 90.
126. Under the STL statute, such an individual would have court appointed
counsel. See STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(2) (c). While providing counsel for the
accused is laudable, it does not remedy notice defects. See infra Part III.B.4.c.
127. It is unclear in which country someone convicted by the STL would serve their
sentence. The website for the STL states, "Sentences will be served in a State designated
by the President of the Special Tribunal from a list of States that would have expressed
their willingness to accept persons convicted by the Special Tribunal." Special Tribunal
for.Lebanon, About the STL, http://www.stl-tsl.org/section/aboutthesl (last visited
Dec. 1, 2009). "[W]ould have expressed their willingness" reads quite differently than
saying states that have expressed their willingness. The implication is that no states have
yet expressed their "willingness," although, given that there are no trials even pending,
this seems, if anything, a prospective issue.
128. The location of the jail in which the fugitive would be incarcerated following
extradition would also be relevant. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2; ICCPR Optional
Protocol, supra note 31, art. 1.
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so the HRC could not consider a communication against either
Lebanon or the STL. 129 While that would seem to end any
potential HRC inquiry before it begins, that is not necessarily so.
If the person tried, convicted, and sentenced in absentia by the
STL is located in the territory of a state party to the ICCPR and
OPI, and the STL seeks extradition, a communication to the
HRC is permissible. 130 While Syria is not a party to OPI, Libya
and Algeria, and 111 other countries, are. 31 If a fugitive were
located in Algeria, a communication to the HRC need not
(indeed could not) complain that the STL violated the fugitive's
rights under the ICCPR, but rather, could assert that Algeria was
violating the fugitive's rights under the ICCPR by extraditing the
person following an in absentia trial at the STL for which the
fugitive did not receive proper notice and may not be entitled to
a retrial.
It is irrelevant that the underlying issue is a violation of fair
trial rights by a nonparty to OP1 (i.e. the STL). The HRC has
previously stated:
Article 2 of the Covenant requires States parties to guarantee
the rights of persons within their jurisdiction. If a person is
lawfully expelled or extradited, the State party concerned
will not generally have responsibility under the Covenant for
any violations of that person's rights that may later occur in
the other jurisdiction. In that sense a State party clearly is not
required to guarantee the rights of persons within another
jurisdiction. However, if a State party takes a decision relating to a
person within its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable
consequence is that that person's rights under the Covenant will be
violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in
violation of the Covenant .... The foreseeability of the consequence
would mean that there was a present violation by the State party,
even though the consequence would not occur until later on.132
So if the STL's in absentia trial provisions violate article 14
of the ICCPR, the "necessary and foreseeable consequence" of
Algeria extraditing a fugitive convicted in absentia by the STL is
129. See ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 31, art. 1. The related question of
whether the U.N. Human Rights Committee ("HRC") could ever consider U.N. actions,
and thus whether the U.N. may violate human rights, is beyond the scope of this Article.
130. See id.
131. Treaty Section, supra note 90.
132. Kindler, supra note 82, 6.2 (emphasis added).
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that the fugitive's ICCPR right to a fair trial would be violated.
Thus, Algeria may violate its ICCPR obligations even though it
had nothing to do with the flawed trial that triggered the
violation.
b. Notice Provisions
In considering whether the in absentia provisions violate
article 14,133 the STL's notice provisions are particularly
vulnerable to criticism. In Maleki, the HRC held that assuming
that the accused learned of the proceedings against him from
court-appointed counsel was "clearly insufficient" to meet the
notice requirements to try the accused in absentia. 134 A court
trying someone in absentia must verify that the accused has been
informed of the proceedings. It is insufficient to assume
knowledge,13 5 as clearly do the STL's notice "otherwise given"
provisions. 3 6 Indeed, the STL's notice provisions, which speak to
notifying the accused or serving him or her with an indictment, 137
are not at issue. But the STL's notice-otherwise-given provisions
rely on much greater assumptions than the "clearly insufficient"
Italian assumptions that were found to violate the ICCPR in
Maleki. Under the STL's notice-otherwise-given provisions, the
notice requirement is met if the indictment against the accused is
published in the media, or communicated to the accused's state
of residence or state of nationality.138 These mechanisms, whether
used individually or together to provide notice, fail to meet the
ICCPR's notice requirement.139
133. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14(3) (d).
134. Maleki, supra note 26, 9.4.
135. See id.
136. SeeSTL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(2) (a).
137. See id.
138. See id. (emphasis added).
139. One could perhaps cobble a counter argument from the HRC's ruling in
Mbenge v. Zaire, a 1983 case in which the HRC held that even where an accused
acknowledges learning of proceedings against him through the media, the state trying
the accused has not met its ICCPR article 14 notice obligations. See HRC, Communication
No. 16/1977: Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Mbenge v.
Zaire), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/16/1977 (Mar. 25, 1983). On its face, Mbenge hardly
seems to lend support for the STL's notice provisions. But Zaire had not published the
indictment through the media. The accused simply learned of his trial through media
coverage of the proceedings. Id. 2.2. Although Zaire possessed the accused's correct
address in Belgium, there was "no indication... of any steps actually taken by [Zaire] in
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i. Publication
Publishing an indictment in the media as the sole means of
providing notice of proceedings is the functional equivalent of
Italy impermissibly assuming notice in Maleki. In giving notice by
publication, the tribunal assumes that the accused will view the
notice or learn of it from someone who does. The HRC will
consider that assumption clearly insufficient, as it did Italy's
assumption in Maleki, and the resulting trial will be held to be a
violation of the accused's ICCPR fair trial rights.
ii. State of Residence
For the STL to communicate the indictment to the
accused's state of residence is understandable on a practical level
but likely no less an ICCPR violation. One can envision a
circumstance in which the STL indicts an individual believed to
reside in Algeria, Libya, or any of the other states party to OPI. It
would seem appropriate for the STL to communicate the
indictment to that state and request the individual's transfer. If
the state declines to do so, 140 the STL understandably might
proceed to try the individual in absentia, but, under Maleki, the
trial would nonetheless be a violation of the ICCPR. The
standard the HRC articulated in Maleki was not that a state make
reasonable efforts to give notice, but rather that a state must
verify that the accused was informed of the case beforehand. 141
Communicating the indictment to Algeria may be reasonable
under the circumstances, but by itself does not constitute
verification that the accused was informed of the proceedings
against him. Accordingly, this mechanism in the STL's notice-
otherwise-given provisions also violates the ICCPR.
order to transmit the summonses to the [accused]." Id. 14.2. Viewed literally, the
HRC's holding in Mbenge is unsurprising-a state's failure to make any effort to notify
the accused of proceedings against him violates the ICCPR. As applied to the STL, the
interesting question Mbenge presents is what if Zaire had published the notice and the
accused acknowledged reading it?
140. There is at least one instance in which the U.N. Security Council has
intervened when a state refused to turn over fugitives wanted for prosecution. See S.C.
Res. 748, 111-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (placing economic and
diplomatic sanctions on Libya for failing to cooperate with the Pan Am flight 103 crash
investigation, including not surrendering individuals suspected of involvement).
141. See Maleki, supra note 26, 9.4.
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iii. Nationality
Finally, and possibly least defensible of the notice-otherwise-
given mechanisms, the STL may communicate an indictment to
the accused's state of nationality.142 Presumably, the STL would
utilize this mechanism when it does not know where the accused
is in the world, thus limiting the tribunal's ability to publish
notice through the media and denying the STL the option of
communicating the indictment to the accused's State of
residence. Under this mechanism, if the STL indicts a Yemini
national for his involvement in the Hariri assassination but has
no idea of his whereabouts, the STL satisfies its notice
requirement and may permissibly try the accused in absentia by
merely communicating the indictment to Yemini officials. That
the accused may not have resided in Yemen for years and that
Yemen also may not know where its national is and thus have no
ability to communicate the indictment are irrelevant under the
STL's notice-otherwise-given requirements. However, these facts
are relevant to, and bode poorly for the STL in any HRC
review.143 The STL's efforts under this mechanism at notifying
the accused are less defensible than when the STL has at least
been able to identify in which state the accused resides. As a
result, communicating the indictment to the accused's state of
nationality on the assumption that the state knows where the
accused is and can and will communicate the indictment, is even
more likely to violate the ICCPR than the other two mechanisms
in the STL's notice-otherwise-given provisions. This mechanism,
like that of communicating the indictment to the state of
residence, is an attempt by the STL at shifting away from the
burden to ensure the accused has notice of the proceedings.
While such a shift may not be impermissible for Lebanon, which
is not a party to OPI, it is a violation of OPI for countries that are
parties to cooperate with the STL in handing over fugitives tried
in absentia by the STL on the basis of the notice-otherwise-given
provisions. 144 Even if the STL remedies the violation by providing
defense counsel and a right of retrial (which, as the discussion
that follows indicates, are by no means clear remedies), any
142. See STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22 (2) (a).
143. See Maleki, supra note 26, 9.4.
144. See ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 31, art. 1.
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finding by a human rights body such as the HRC that the STL's
notice-otherwise-given provisions violate the ICCPR's fair trial
rights would be a staggeringly negative outcome for a U.N.
sanctioned tribunal.
c. Does the Right to Counsel or Retrial Cure the Violation?
The two potentially curative provisions under the STL
statute are that the tribunal's defense office will assign an absent
accused a defense counsel, 145 and that the accused has a right of
in person retrial. 146 On the issue of defense counsel, as the HRC
stated in Maleki, that the STL appoints defense counsel for an
individual tried in absentia does not alter the conclusion-the
subsequent proceedings will not be considered a fair trial. 147 As
to the issue of a retrial, assuming, arguendo, that the STL's
notice-otherwise-given mechanisms do violate the ICCPR, a right
of retrial would remedy any such violation. 148 On its face the STL
provides such a right.149 But on its face Italian law provided a
right to retrial, just not as applied to Maleki. 150 So the issue is not
just whether the STL generally provides a right of retrial, it is
whether a specific accused, convicted in absentia, has an actual
right of retrial. If someone is convicted in absentia by the STL
and located within the next three years, they may indeed have an
actual right of retrial that could cure any ICCPR violation created
by the deficient notice provisions. If however as is more likely,
the individual is not located for some years in the future and the
STL is no longer operating, the analysis is more complicated. In
the HRC context, such a "right" to retrial seems dangerously
145. See STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(2)(c). This analysis is predicated on a
scenario in which the accused did not designate his or her defense counsel. Obviously if
an accused does so designate, it is in response to knowing of the proceedings for which
one needs a defense counsel, so significant notice concerns are unlikely.
146. See id. art. 22(3). The assumption from note 145 that the accused did not
designate his or her own defense counsel continues to the retrial analysis. While the STL
excepts out the right of retrial where the accused designated counsel, that exception is
not problematic as the accused obviously had notice of the proceedings. Also, the STL
allows for a rather obvious exception to the right of retrial-where the accused tried in
absentia accepts the judgment. Built into this exception is an accused not complaining
of the in absentia process, thus this exception is also unremarkable.
147. See Maleki, supra note 26, 6.4.
148. See id. I 11.
149. See STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(3).
150. See Maleki, supra note 26, 9.5.
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similar to that in Maleki-a theoretical right and not a practical
reality and thus a violation of the ICCPR. 151
The STL's in absentia trial provisions do not meet the fair
trial requirements of the ICCPR. Attempting to comply with an
STL extradition request following an in absentia trial may place
an extraditing State that is a party to OP1 in a precarious position
vis-f-vis its own ICCPR obligations. That position may be even
more untenable if instead of utilizing the ICCPR's complaint
mechanism, someone convicted in absentia by the STL relies on
the European Convention to challenge their extradition.
152
B. European Convention
1. Fair Trial Provisions
The European Convention "is an international treaty under
which the member States of the Council of Europe promise to
secure fundamental civil and political rights, not only to their
own citizens (currently numbering 800 million people) but also
to everyone within their jurisdiction, irrespective of, for example,
sex, race, nationality or ethnic origin."1 53 All forty-seven member
states of the council have acceded to the European
Convention. 154
Unlike the ICCPR, the European Convention does not
unambiguously grant an accused the right to be present at trial.
Under the European Convention, the right to be present is
implicit within other stated rights. For example, within article 6
(right to a fair trial), the European Convention provides that
"everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing,"1 55 and that
everyone has the rights to "defend himself in person,"1 56 to
151. See id.
152. That is because unlike HRC decisions, "final decisions by the ECtHR are
largely considered to be binding." DAN STIGALL, COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE
COMPARATIVE LAW OF INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 16 (2009). Moreover, most members
of the Council of Europe have made the European Convention directly enforceable
through their domestic legal system. See id. at 117.
153. European Court of Human Rights, Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008, at 1
(2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/acf7093-193749af-8be6-36feOfee1759/
0/factsandfiguresenglOansnov.pdf (emphasis added).
154. See European Convention, supra note 25, pmbl. para. 1.
155. Id. art. 6(1).
156. Id. art. 6(3)(c).
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"examine or have examined witnesses," 157 and "to have the free
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court."' 58 The ECtHR has held that "it is
difficult to see how [an accused] could exercise these rights
without being present"1 59 and that "the object and purpose of
[article 6] taken as a whole show that a person 'charged with a
criminal offence' is entitled to take part in the hearing."'160
2. Enforcement and Extraterritorial Application
The ECtHR was established in 1959 as part of, and to
monitor member states' compliance with, the European
Convention.16' The court has 'jurisdiction to rule, through
binding judgments, on individual and interstate applications
alleging violations of the convention. '" 162 Under article 1, "The
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention.' 6 3 Section I's rights and freedoms include the
article 6 fair trial rights. 64 How and to what extent member states
risk violating the European Convention by extraditing someone
from Europe at the request of the STL is unclear. One view is
that article 1 "cannot be read as justifying a general principle to
the effect that a Contracting State may not surrender an
individual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the
country of destination are in full accord with each of the
safeguards of the Convention.' ' 165 But the court has also expressly
not excluded the possibility that "an issue might exceptionally be
157. Id. art. 6(3) (d).
158. Id. art. 6(3) (e).
159. Sejdovic v. Italy, App. No. 56581/00, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 7 44 (2004) (citing
Belziuk v. Poland, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 558, 570, 7 37; T. v. Italy, 245-C Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 41, 26 (1993); F.C.B. v Italy, 208-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21, 33 (1991);
Colozza v. Italy, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14, 27 (1985)).
160. Id.
161. See European Court of Human Rights, supra note 153.
162. Id.
163. European Convention, supra note 25, art. 1.
164. See id. art. 6.
165. Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, 346 (Bratza, J., partly
dissenting) (citing Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32-36, It
83, 88-91 (1989)). Again, the state or states in which those convicted by the STL would
serve their jail sentences have not been identified. See supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
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raised under Article 6 by an extradition decision in
circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a
flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country."'' 66
Therefore, analyzing the permissibility of a proposed
extradition between member states under the European
Convention differs from that of a member state extraditing a
person to a nonmember state. How the analysis differs seems to
depend on the difference between a "regular" violation of the
European Convention, such as for an intra-European extradition,
and "flagrant" violations, such as for a member state extraditing
a fugitive to a non-member state. 167 Understanding how the
ECtHR applied article 6 in a case involving an extradition request
among member states establishes a baseline from which
extradition to a non-member state, like the STL, may be
considered. That baseline provides a norm to assess whether the
STL's in absentia trial provisions constitute a flagrant violation of
the European Convention.
3. ECtHR Interpretation of In Absentia Proceedings Balanced
Against the European Convention's Fair Trial Rights
Similar in many ways to the HRC's Maleki decision, the
ECtHR in Sejdovic v. Italy addressed the level and type of notice
required before permissibly trying someone in absentia,168 which
side bears the burden of proving or disproving notice, 69 and if a
state must afford a right to retrial. 70 The case arose from a
complaint to the ECtHR by Ismet Sejdovic, a Yugoslavian
national, against Italy stemming from his 1996 in absentia trial
and conviction.' 71 At that trial, an Italian court found Sejdovic
guilty of the fatal shooting of a man in an encampment in Rome
in 1992.172 Witnesses identified Sejdovic as the individual
responsible, and, a month after the shooting, an Italian
166. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45, 7 113.
167. The higher standard for intra-European extraditions may play an interesting
role if the STL, the state from which extradition is sought, and the state in which those
sentenced to confinement by the STL are all located in Europe.
168. See Sejdovic v. Italy, App. No. 56581/00, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 31 (2004).
169. Seeid. 15.
170. See id. 30.
171. See id. 77 1, 3.
172. See id. 7 8, 12.
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investigating judge ordered Sejdovic's detention pending trial.173
Italian authorities could not locate Sejdovic to enforce the order
and, believing that he was deliberately evading justice, declared
him a fugitive. 74 Italian authorities assigned Sejdovic a lawyer
and tried him in absentia. 175 Although Sejdovic was not present,
his court-appointed attorney attended and actively participated
in the trial. 176 Sejdovic was convicted of manslaughter and
illegally carrying a weapon, and sentenced to twenty-one years,
eight months imprisonment. 77 Sejdovic's defense attorney
declined to appeal the conviction, which became final in 1997.178
In 1999 German police arrested Sejdovic in Hamburg pursuant
to an Italian arrest warrant. 79 Shortly thereafter the Italian
Minister of Justice requested that Germany extradite Sejdovic to
Italy to serve his prison sentence. 80 German authorities then
sought additional information from Italy on Sejdovic's case.'8 '
Italy acknowledged that Sejdovic had never been officially
notified of the charges against him and that Italy did not know
whether Sejdovic had been in contact with his court appointed
attorney.8 2 The conversation between Germany and Italy then
turned to whether Sejdovic was entitled to a new trial in Italy
should Germany extradite him. 8 3 When Italy informed Germany
that Sejdovic may request a new trial, but that such requests are
not automatically granted, Germany refused Italy's extradition
request and released Sejdovic. 184 Sejdovic then petitioned the
ECtHR, claiming that Italy violated his right to fair trial under
article 6 of the European Convention by not informing him of
the accusations against him and by convicting him in absentia
without providing him the opportunity to present a defense.18 5
173. See id. 118-9.
174. See id. 9.
175. See id. 7 10-11. Four others suspected of involvement in the shooting were
also tried. See id. 10.
176. See id. 11 11, 15. Sejdovic's attorney called "a large number of witnesses" to
testify. Id. 15.
177. See id. 112.
178. See id. 13.
179. See id. 14.
180. See id.
181. See id. 15.
182. See id.
183. See id. 16.
184. See id. 15-16.
185. See id. 3, 19-20.
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Italy argued to the ECtHR that it had respected Sejdovic's
rights under the European Convention. Italy claimed that it not
only had appointed Sejdovic an attorney, but one who mounted
an effective defense. I8 6 Italy pointed to the fact that the same
attorney had been appointed for all the defendants and that
three had been acquitted. 18 7 Italy stressed that throughout the
process it provided notice of upcoming proceedings to Sejdovic's
lawyer and not Sejdovic because he "had deliberately sought to
evade justice and had been deemed to be a fugitive."' 88 That
Sejdovic became untraceable immediately after the shooting
amounted to a waiver of his right to appear at trial, at least
according to Italy. 89 Under this view, Italy claimed that the
ECtHR could and indeed should infer from Sejdovic's actions
that he intended to escape trial. 190
The ECtHR agreed that neither the letter nor even the spirit
of the European Convention's fair trial provisions precluded "a
person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or
tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial; however,
any such waiver must be made in an unequivocal manner."' 91
The court found "no evidence that [Sejdovic] knew of the
proceedings against him or of the date of his trial."'192 Nor was
the court willing to assume any inferences from the accused's
travel to Germany.19 3 In the ECtHR's view:
[T] o inform someone of a prosecution brought against
him is a legal act of such importance that it must be carried
out in accordance with procedural and substantive
requirements capable of guaranteeing the effective exercise
186. See id. 21.
187. See id. 21. That point seemed to cut both ways though as Sejdovic noted that
the defendants who had been acquitted were present at trial, while the two who were
convicted were tried in absentia. See id. 20. The other defendant convicted in absentia
was convicted of the same offenses as Sejdovic and sentenced to fifteen years and eight
months imprisonment. See id. 1 12.
188. Id. 1 22. Italy also noted that it only declared Sejdovic a fugitive after
searching for him at the nomad camp in Rome where he was supposedly living. See id.
189. See id. 32.
190. See id.
191. Id. 33.
192. Id. 1 34. According to the court, that the accused was not at his usual place of
residence when the Italian police attempted to arrest him created nothing more than an
"impression that he was aware or feared that the police were searching for him." Id.
193. See id. 35.
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of the accused's rights .... Vague and informal knowledge
cannot suffice ....
Consequently, even supposing that [Sejdovic] was
indirectly aware that criminal proceedings had been opened
against him, it cannot be inferred that he unequivocally
waived his right to appear at his trial.'94
Italy's failure to ensure that Sejdovic had notice of the
proceedings constituted a violation of article 6 of the European
Convention and turned the court's inquiry to whether a retrial
might remedy the violation. 95 Italy claimed that in order for
Sejdovic to receive a retrial, he could have appealed his
conviction by "simply" showing that he had been unaware of the
proceedings. 96 But under Italian law, he needed to do so within
ten days after he learned of his conviction, "failing which [the
appeal] shall be inadmissible."'197 So by the time that Sejdovic and
Italy were submitting the matter to the ECtHR, Sejdovic had not,
and thus no longer could, request a new trial. Italy argued that
the fact its law provided Sejdovic "a genuine chance" of a new
trial met the European Convention's fair trial principles. 19 A
possibility of a new trial, and especially a possibility that no
longer existed, was not enough for the court. Absent an
unequivocal waiver of the right to appear, a person convicted in
absentia "must in all cases be able to obtain afresh determination by a
court of the merits of the charge."'99
4. Would Extradition of Someone Convicted In Absentia by the
STL Violate Obligations Under the European Convention?
Sejdovic provides a baseline for how the ECtHR views and
applies the European Convention to in absentia trial proceedings
administered by a member state. That baseline informs as to
when a state commits a "regular" violation of the European
Convention in the type and manner of notice provided before
194. Id. 11 35-36 (emphasis added).
195. See id. 1 36, 41-42.
196. Id. 24.
197. Id. 1 18.
198. Id. 1 25. Italy's argument was that, assuming someone tried in absentia timely
filed an appeal once they learned of the conviction, the only reason they would not
receive a new trial was if their absence had been intentional, which would constitute a
deliberate waiver such that a new trial was not required. See id.
199. Id. 1 39 (emphasis added).
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trying someone in absentia, the relevance of court appointed
counsel, and the significance of the right of retrial. But in the
context of the STL, the issue is whether the tribunal's in absentia
provisions violate the European Convention. If so, a member
state may violate its own obligations under the European
Convention by complying with the extradition request. Before
parsing out whether the in absentia trial provisions of the STL
flagrantly violate the European Convention, the procedure for
filing a relevant communication to the ECtHR challenging
extradition, and how the European Convention applies
extraterritorially, bears mention.
a. Mechanics of an Extradition Challenge
Assume a similar hypothetical to that used discussing the
ICCPR, in which a person tried, convicted, and sentenced to a
prison sentence by the STL, in absentia, is located years later, but
this time in France.200 The STL requests that France extradite the
fugitive to serve his or her sentence.201
How someone would be able to file a relevant
communication is more straightforward than with the ICCPR and
OP1 complaint mechanism. Under the European Convention,
the ECtHR may "receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of
the rights set forth in the Convention." 20 2 And, as already
discussed, the European Convention affords protections
expressly not just to the citizens of member states, but to
"everyone within their jurisdiction, irrespective of... nationality
200. As a BBC news story described, France and Syria have a "tangled history," so
in the case of a Syrian national seeking to evade the STL, France would seem a plausible
destination. Alan Little, France and Syria: A Tangled History, BBC NEWS, Sept. 7, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3635650.stm. Moreover, the one potential
suspect in custody for the Hariri assassination is Syrian, and while he was most recently
detained in the United Arab Emirates, he had previously been detained in France. See
Suspect Arrested in Hariri Assassination, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 20, 2009,
http://www.upi.com/topnews/special/2009/04/20/
suspect-arrested-in-hariri-assassination/UPI-96091240244831/.
201. France has already refused one Lebanese extradition request related to the
Hariri assassination in 2005 for a Syrian intelligence agent. See Suspect Arrested in Hariri
Assassination, supra note 200. France apprehended the individual but refused to
extradite him based on concerns that he would be executed. See id.
202. European Convention, supra note 25, art. 34.
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or ethnic origin." 203 So a Syrian-national fugitive from the STL
living in France may submit a communication to the ECtHR
challenging his extradition.
Turning to the issue of whether and how the ECtHR could
even consider a challenge to the STL's in absentia trial
provisions, a communication to the court alleging that the STL
violated the European Convention would be inadmissible as the
STL is not a high contracting party to the convention.20 4 To be
admissible, the communication would have to allege that, in
complying with the STL's extradition request, France would
violate its obligations under the European Convention. That
there is an extraterritorial application of the European
Convention for its states parties, like France, is clear enough, but
the scope of that obligation is anything but. Assuming the jail is
not located in Europe, whether extradition from France of
someone convicted in absentia by the STL constitutes a violation
of the European Convention by France raises a slightly different
question than that of the intramember state extradition issue in
Sejdovi. 205 Between member states of the European Convention,
one view is that "mere irregularities" or a "lack of safeguards"
may constitute a breach of article 6.206 But in assessing whether
an extradition by France to a country outside of Europe would
violate France's obligations under the European Convention, a
more significant or fundamental violation of article 6 is
required.20 7 The permissibility of such an extradition from
France would depend on whether the subject "has suffered or
risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial" by the STL.20 8
Regardless, the subject may seek relief from the ECtHR, if and
when an individual convicted in absentia by the STL is found in
203. European Court of Human Rights, supra note 153.
204. See European Convention, supra note 25, art. 35(3).
205. Sejdovic was located in Germany, from where Italy sought his extradition. See
Sejdovic v. Italy, App. No. 56581/00, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 14 (2004).
206. Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, 14 (Grand Chamber)
(Bratza, J., partly dissenting).
207. In one Chamber's view, "what the word 'flagrant' is intended to convey is a
breach of the principles of fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 which is so fundamental as
to amount to a nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed
by that Article." Id.
208. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45, 113 (1989).
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France, or any one of the forty-seven European Council member
States, and the STL requests his or her extradition. 209
b. Notice Provisions
The ECtHR acknowledged in Sejdovic that the European
Convention does not per se prohibit in absentia trials.210
However, that openness to in absentia trials in theory likely does
not extend to the reality of the STL's notice-otherwise-given
provisions. 211
The ECtHR held in Sejdovic that while a person may tacitly
waive his or her right to be present at trial, "any such waiver must
be made in an unequivocal manner."212 The court was willing to
suppose that Sejdovic was indirectly aware of the proceedings
against him but held that, despite such awareness, the state
cannot infer unequivocal waiver.213 Thus, the STL's notice-
otherwise-given provisions do not meet the ECtHR's
requirements. Publishing the indictment in the media or
communicating it to the state of residence or nationality is, at
best, the "vague and informal knowledge" of criminal
proceedings the court held "cannot suffice." 214 At a minimum,
the STL's notice-otherwise-given provisions violate the European
Convention. As a result, were France to extradite a fugitive
convicted in absentia by the STL to a jail located in a European
state, France would violate its obligations under the European
Convention.215  The inquiry then turns to whether court-
appointed counsel or a right of retrial cures that violation.
209. Assuming the other admissibility criteria of article 35 of the European
Convention are satisfied. See European Convention, supra note 25, art. 35. This includes
a requirement that the individual exhaust domestic remedies so the individual would
first need to petition the courts of the European state from which their extradition was
sought. See id.
210. See Sejdovic, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 1 33.
211. See STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(2) (a).
212. Sejdovic, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 1 33.
213. See id. 1 35-36.
214. Id. 35.
215. This is assuming that the jail used by the STL is located in a European state.
The STL has not yet determined the location where those sentenced to confinement will
be incarcerated. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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c. Does the Right to Counsel or Retrial Cure the Violation?
Simply put, the STL's provisions for court appointed
defense counsel for those tried in absentia do not cure the
deficiencies of notice otherwise given. Indeed, that the STL's in
absentia provisions require that a defense counsel will be
assigned to ensure "full representation of the interests and
rights" of an accused tried in absentia borders on irrelevance in
terms of the European Convention and the ECtHR's waiver
inquiry. 216 The issue is not representation, effective or otherwise.
The issue is whether the accused has notice of the proceedings
against him. An attorney appointed by the STL does not establish
notice to the accused, let alone proof of unequivocal waiver.
Next is the curative possibility of the right of retrial. The
court in Sejdovic could not have been clearer on the importance
of a right of retrial when an individual is convicted in absentia
absent the required unequivocal waiver. The individual "must in
all cases be able to obtain a fresh determination by a court of the
merits of the charge." 217 As Italy's argument that its criminal
procedure code provided for retrials and that Sejdovic had a
chance of retrial failed, so would an analogous argument by a
state party to the European Convention from which extradition
of a person tried in absentia by the STL was sought. If such a
person were located in France during the pendency of the STL,
that person would seek relief from the ECtHR arguing that
France would violate its obligations under the European
Convention by complying with an extradition request. Here,
France could argue both that the STL provided a statutory right
to retrial and that, with the STL still operating, the right was
available to the individual subject to the extradition request. But
once the STL ceases operation and a fugitive is then found in
France, any claim that retrial is available would be little more
than speculative. In this scenario, France may argue that the U.N.
Security Council could "restart" the STL in order to retry the
individual, but could not guarantee so to the ECtHR.218
216. STL Statute, supra note 22, art. 22(3).
217. Sejdovic, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 39.
218. The mechanism by which the Security Council could preserve the ability to
restart the STL might be to remain "seized of the matter." See Michael C. Wood, The
Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS
LAw 73 (1998).
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Accordingly, France would not be able to claim that the
individual would in fact receive a new adjudication by the STL. If
France or any other European extraditing state is not able to
guarantee retrial for a fugitive convicted in absentia by the STL,
the specter of what the ECtHR considers a "flagrant denial of
justice" looms large. 219
d. "Flagrant Denial of Justice"
In straightforward fashion, the ECtHR has considered
"whether the requirement of article 6 to ensure the right of the
accused to be present during the proceedings against him or her
is so basic as to render proceedings conducted in absentia and
whose reopening has been refused a "'flagrant denial of
justice."' 220 The court's equally clear answer was that
"a denial of justice undoubtedly occurs where a person
convicted in absentia is unable subsequently to obtain from a
court which has heard him a fresh determination of the
merits of the charge, in respect of both law and fact, where it
has not been unequivocally established that he has waived his
right to appear and to defend himself." This conclusion is in
line with the established case-law confirming that the right of
an accused to participate in the proceedings is a
fundamental element of a fair trial. 221
219. Stoichkov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 9808/02, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, 1 51 (2005).
220. Id. 1 54 (quoting Drozd v. France, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (1992)).
Stoichkov dealt with issues of Bulgarian law and not extradition, let alone extradition
outside Europe. See id. Stoichkov does however provide the ECtHR's view on where on
the spectrum of importance the right to be present at trial lies, and thus the magnitude
of a violation of that right.
221. Id. 1 55 (citations omitted) (quoting Einhorn v. France, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
275, 1 55 (2001)). Although Einhorn was a decision on the admissibility of an
application to the ECtHR, the underlying issues are extremely relevant to a discussion
on extraditing a fugitive outside Europe based on an in absentia proceeding. Einhorn
was a U.S. national who was arrested in the United States for the murder of his
girlfriend. See Einhorn, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 275, 11 1, 2. After being released on bail,
he fled to France. See id. 1 3. In 1993, a Pennsylvania court tried Einhorn in absentia. He
was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. See id. 1 2.
In 1997, Einhorn was located in France and the United States requested his extradition.
See id. 1 3. A French court determined that, as Einhorn had not unequivocally waived
the right to defend himself in person, had not chosen his defense counsel, and was not
entitled to a retrial, for France to extradite Einhorn to the United States would be in
violation of France's obligations under the European Convention. See id. 4.
Accordingly, France denied the extradition request. See id. Only after the Pennsylvania
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The ECtHR's conclusion flows from a state party's
obligation, indeed duty, "to guarantee the right of a criminal
defendant to be present in the courtroom-either during the
original proceedings or in a retrial after he or she emerges." 222
Per the ECtHR, the right to be present is one of the "essential
requirements of Article 6"223 and to try someone in absentia and
not provide a retrial absent unequivocal waiver is "'manifestly
contrary"' to that article. 224
It is thus equally straightforward that the STL's notice-
otherwise-given provisions violate the European Convention. The
violations are of substantive rights, and if the STL is no longer
functioning at the time a fugitive is apprehended and challenges
extradition, any "right" to retrial would be speculative and thus
the violation will be considered flagrant. If the STL has ceased
operations, the result for a third-party state like France is that, by
extraditing a fugitive convicted in absentia by the STL, that state
would violate its own obligations under the European
Convention. If the STL is still operating, the right to retrial may
correct the deficiencies of the notice otherwise given. But the
ripple effect of the STL's flawed in absentia provisions will reach
the legacy of the STL, the development of future tribunals, and
even the role of the U.N.
IV. THE PRICE TO BE PAID
The STL's notice-otherwise-given provisions violate both the
ICCPR and the European Convention. That the STL will appoint
defense counsel for those tried in absentia does not alter that
outcome. Similarly, for the STL to afford a right to retrial may
cure the violation, but does not alter the staggering conclusion
that provisions of a U.N.-sanctioned tribunal violate human
rights norms. In the quite-possible event that a fugitive tried in
absentia by the STL is not found until after the STL ceases
operation, then what is essentially a U.N.-brokered human rights
violation will stand unchecked. Even if the STL never utilizes its
legislature modified a state statute so that Einhorn would be entitled to a retrial did the
extradition occur. See id. 5.
222. Stoichkov, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, 1 51 (2005), 56.
223. Id.
224. Id. (quoting Drozd, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35).
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in absentia trial provisions, the damage to the STL, to future
tribunals, and to the U.N. has already largely been done.
A. STL
The STL's in absentia provisions will eventually erode its
own legitimacy, first abroad and then within Lebanon. As this
Article described, the STL's in absentia provisions will be found
lacking if either the HRC or ECtHR are involved in the
assessment. The indirect manner in which this will occur
increases the negativity with which some third party states may
come to view the STL. This Article utilized hypothetical examples
of how the STL's in absentia provisions may be found deficient
under human rights law. Implicit in those examples are states,
like Algeria and France, where those convicted by the STL may
be found years later. In arguing that the state is not violating its
human rights obligations by extraditing someone convicted in
absentia by the STL, states, like Algeria or France, would be in
the awkward position of defending the STL's in absentia
provisions despite having had nothing to do with them. The
equally unpalatable alternative would be to refuse an extradition
request from a U.N.-sanctioned tribunal, thereby being perceived
as thwarting international justice. 225
The result of that dilemma will lead in turn to the STL
losing legitimacy within Lebanon. Whatever sense of closure or
justice in absentia trials at the STL afford the families of the
bombing victims and the people of Lebanon in the short term
will be undone when a fugitive involved in the assassination is
able to cloak himself as the victim of human rights violations and
to characterize the, STL and an unfortunate third party state as
the human rights violators. Neither are the Lebanese likely to
take pride in the effect of the STL's in absentia provisions on
future tribunals.
225. And also, potentially being on the receiving end of a U.N. Security Council
resolution to surrender the individual(s) wanted or face sanctions. See supra note 140.
Given the ability to veto, that would be an unlikely result for a state like France, or any of
the other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.
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B. Future Tribunals
Some may argue that, because of the unique purview of the
STL-holding those responsible for a discrete terrorist event-
the tribunal's in absentia provisions, even if flawed, will not be
replicated in future tribunals. It is true that for tribunals dealing
with mass atrocities and war crimes, there are a host of other,
more applicable, tribunals from which to draw. But for those
discrete terror events with a transnational component, like the
Mumbai bombings, 26 the STL is much more relatable, and its
uniqueness renders its provisions quite likely to be drawn from.
After the IMT and until the STL, the international
community could point to the uninterrupted custom and
practice of not allowing total in absentia proceedings in an
international tribunal. But not any longer. The responsibility for
this unfortunate development lies with the U.N.
C. United Nations
In adopting the STL and its explicit support of total in
absentia trials the U.N. crossed a veritable Rubicon, which augurs
poorly for future tribunals. On what grounds could the U.N.
oppose such provisions in later tribunals? Perhaps even more
troubling is that the adoption of the STL's in absentia trial
provisions by the U.N. may be construed to mean that even
seemingly settled areas of criminal procedure are now negotiable
in future tribunals.
Marshalling support for international criminal tribunals is a
challenging enough undertaking without the added burdens that
arise from the in absentia trial provisions of the STL. Future
challenges to the STL's in absentia trial provisions are likely to
226. See Randeep Ramesh, Indian PM Accuses 'Official Agencies' in Pakistan of Being
Behind Mumbai Attacks, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 7, 2009, at 23 (referring to the three-
day terror attacks of November 2008 in Mumbai, India, for which some allege Pakistan's
involvement). Another example, and which bears some similarities to the events which
led to the STL, is found in Iraq. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called for the
establishment of an international tribunal to investigate the August 2009 suicide truck
bombings in Baghdad against the Iraqi foreign and finance ministries, killing an
estimated one hundred people. Members of the Iraqi government claim that two Syrian
nationals planned and financed the bombings and that Syria refused to surrender the
suspects. Sameer Yacoub, Iraq Presses UN Envoy on Bombings Tribunal, Syria, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 6, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8694130.
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cause difficulties for third-party states potentially exposed to such
challenges, which will negatively influence these states' political,
policy, and financial support for future U.N. tribunals. The world
community's monetary support of international criminal
tribunals is already limited and delays in ending both the ICTY
and ICTR are likely to strain international financial support for
future tribunals. 227 The U.N. expended financial support and
hard-earned credibility within the international community in
establishing and now operating the STL. Both will be difficult to
recover any time soon.
V. CONCLUSION
Lebanon and the U.N. would do well to reconsider the
words of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. While discussing
post conflict reconstruction, the Secretary-General's comments
on balancing peace and justice are almost prescient of the STL.
The Secretary-General cautioned:
[W] e should remember that the process of achieving justice
for victims may take many years, and it must not come at the
expense of the more immediate need to establish the rule of
law on the ground ..... At times, the goals of justice and
reconciliation compete with each other. Each society needs
to form a view about how to strike the right balance between
them .... [I]f we ignore the demands of justice simply to
227. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (describing the
completion strategies for ICTY and ICTR to complete trials by the end of 2008 and all
work in 2010). But see Fausto Pocar, President, ICTY, Assessment and Report ofJudge Fausto
Pocar, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Provided to the Security
Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), 18, delivered to
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/326 (May 14, 2008) (forecasting a timeline by
which ICTY trials would be ongoing into 2010); Dennis Byron, President, ICTR, Report
on the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 67, delivered to
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/322 (May 13, 2008) (forecasting a timeline by
which "at best" some ICTR trial decisions would not likely announced until the later half
of 2009). The ICTY completion timeline may be completely disrupted if, as recently
reported, the capture of former Bosnian Serb commander General Radtko MladiV,
occurs by the end of 2009. See Craig Whitlock, Serbian Officials Say Mladic Is 'Within
Reach, 'WASH. POST, Jul. 30, 2009, at A10 (describing Mladit as Europe's "most wanted
war criminal" for his role in, among other activities, the execution of eight thousand
Muslims in Sebrenica in 1995, the "vorst massacre in Europe since World War II," and a
three-year siege of Sarajevo that leveled the city and killed up to ten thousand people).
2009]
100 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 33:57
secure agreement, the foundations of that agreement will be
fragile, and we will set bad precedents. 228
It borders on cruel irony that what triggered the
involvement of the U.N. in the first place was the perception that
Lebanon was incapable of conducting fair and impartial trials.229
Yet the result of the U.N.'s involvement is a tribunal with flawed
in absentia trial provisions, the consequences of which will
negatively impact the international community more than if the
U.N. had never been involved in the first place. While Lebanon
may have extracted, and the U.N. conceded, the ability to hold
total in absentia trials at the STL through notice otherwise given,
the true price for those concessions will be paid by the
international community.
228. Press Release, The Secretary-General, Secretary-General Expresses Hope for
New Security Council Commitment to Place Justice, Rule of Law at Heart of Efforts to
Rebuild War-Torn Countries, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8892 (Sept. 24, 2003).
229. SeeSTL Agreement, supra note 16.
